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作者：Atakan, Alp E.; Ekmekci, Mehmet
作者单位：Koc University; Northwestern University
摘要：We establish reputation results, under two sided incomplete information, for a class of repeated games. We consider a repeated game that satisfies the assumptions of either Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) [3] or Cripps et al. (2005) [6] and we assume that both players are Stackelberg types with positive probability. If the stage game is not a common interest game, then equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily...
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作者：Delacroix, Alain; Shi, Shouyong
作者单位：University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal; University of Toronto
摘要：We study a market where each seller chooses the quality and price of goods and the number of selling sites. Observing sellers' choices of prices and sites, but not quality, buyers choose which site to visit. A seller's choices of prices can direct buyers' search and signal quality. A unique equilibrium exists and is separating. When the quality differential is large, the equilibrium implements the efficient allocation with public information. Otherwise, the quality of goods and/or the number o...
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作者：Peters, Michael; Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We provide a partial characterization of the set of outcome functions that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the recommendation game described in [T. Yamashita, Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents, Econometrica 78 (2) (2010) 791-801]. We show that the set of outcome functions that can be supported is at least as large as the set supportable by a mechanism designer in the sense of Myerson (Myerson, 1979 [13]). We show how to support random and cor...
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作者：Bishnu, Monisankar
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：This paper opens a new perspective from which one can explain the presence of government intervention in education even in the absence of human capital externality. It argues that consumption externalities can provide rationale for government intervention in education. Within the context of overlapping generations economy, it has also been shown that competitive equilibrium either underaccumulates both physical and human capital or overaccumulates both. Thus the result rules out the possibilit...
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作者：Carbajal, Juan Carlos; Ely, Jeffrey C.
作者单位：University of Queensland; Northwestern University
摘要：We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the envelope theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable valuations. We obtain a characterization of incentive compatibility based on the Mirrlees representation of the indirect utility and a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule, which pin down the range of possible payoffs as a function of the allocation rule. To illustrate our approach we derive the optimal selling mecha...
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作者：Grant, Simon; Polak, Ben
作者单位：University of Queensland; Yale University; Yale University
摘要：We axiomatize, in an Anscombe-Aumann framework, the class of preferences that admit a representation of the form V (f) = mu - p(d), where mu, is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability, d is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and p(d) is a measure of (aversion to) dispersion that corresponds to an uncertainty premium. The key feature of these mean-dispersion preferences is that they exhibit constant absolute uncertainty aversion. This class...
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作者：Boergers, Tilman; Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Kraehmer, Daniel
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of Bonn
摘要：The paper introduces a notion of complementarity (substitutability) of two signals which requires that in all decision problems each signal becomes more (less) valuable when the other signal becomes available. We provide a general characterization which relates complementarity and substitutability to a Blackwell comparison of two auxiliary signals. In a setting with a binary state space and binary signals, we find an explicit characterization that permits an intuitive interpretation of complem...
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作者：Donaldson, John B.; Gershun, Natalia; Giannoni, Marc P.
作者单位：Columbia University; Pace University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：We consider a simple real business cycle model in which shareholders hire self-interested executives to manage their firm. A generic family of compensation contracts similar to those employed in practice is studied. When compensation is convex in the firm's dividend, an increase in the firm's output results in a more than proportional increase in the managers' income. Incentive contracts of sufficient yet modest convexity are shown to result in an indeterminate general equilibrium, one in whic...
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作者：Hayashi, Takashi
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：Partial equilibrium analysis has a conceptual dilemma that its object should be negligibly small in order to be free from income effect but then the consumer does not care for it and the notion of willingness to pay for it does not make sense. In the setting of a continuum of commodities, we propose a limiting procedure which transforms the general many-commodity framework into a partial single-commodity framework. In the limit, willingness to pay for a commodity is established as a density no...
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作者：Hu, Tai-Wei; Rocheteau, Guillaume
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of California System; University of California Irvine; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas
摘要：This paper adopts mechanism design to investigate the coexistence of fiat money and higher-return assets. We consider an economy with pairwise meetings where fiat money and risk-free capital compete as means of payment, as in [28]. The trading mechanism in pairwise meetings is chosen among all individually rational, renegotiation-proof mechanisms to maximize society's welfare. We show that in any stationary monetary equilibrium capital commands a higher rate of return than fiat money. (C) 2013...
