Hidden symmetries and focal points

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Kuzmics, Christoph
• 署名单位: University of Cologne; University of Bielefeld
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.003
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 226-258
• 关键词: symmetry; Focal points; frames; Nash equilibria

摘要

We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.