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作者：Johnson, T. R.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame
摘要：Using a mechanism design framework, we characterize how a profit-maximizing intermediary can design matching markets when each agent is privately informed about his quality as a partner. Sufficient conditions are provided that ensure a version of positive assortative matching (what we call truncated positive assortative matching) maximizes profits. Under these conditions, all-pay position auctions always implement the profit-maximizing allocation. Winners-pay position auctions, however, only d...
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作者：Mailath, George J.; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Mannheim
摘要：We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) [9] result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977) [8], Glosten (1989) [4], and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) [3], that were not previously covered. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Miyahara, Yasuyuki; Sekiguchi, Tadashi
作者单位：Kobe University; Kyoto University
摘要：We study finitely repeated games where players can decide whether to monitor the other players' actions or not every period. Monitoring is assumed to be costless and private. We compare our model with the standard one where the players automatically monitor each other. Since monitoring other players never hurts, any equilibrium payoff vector of a standard finitely repeated game is an equilibrium payoff vector of the same game with monitoring options. We show that some finitely repeated games w...
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作者：Momi, Takeshi
作者单位：Doshisha University
摘要：We show that in pure exchange economies there exists no Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism that ensures positive consumption for all agents. We also show that a Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and non-bossy allocation mechanism is dictatorial. We further show that in three-agent economies, the allocation given by a Pareto-efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial mechanism depends only on one agent's preference who is always allocated zero consumption. That is, in ...
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作者：Schumacher, Heiner
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We study the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with the option to maintain or to quit relationships. We show that if agents imitate successful strategies infrequently, defection is not dynamically stable and cooperation emerges regardless of the initial distribution of strategies. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Shi, Fei
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University
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作者：Cho, In-Koo; Matsui, Akihiko
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Tokyo
摘要：We investigate a canonical search-theoretic model without entry. Two agents are randomly matched with a long side being rationed. The matched agents face a pair of randomly drawn non-transferable payoffs, and then choose whether or not to form a partnership subject to a small probability of exogenous break down. As this probability and friction vanish, the Nash bargaining solution emerges as the unique undominated strategy equilibrium outcome if the mass of each party is the same. If the size ...
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作者：Eichberger, Juergen; Guerdjikova, Ani
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We model decision making under ambiguity based on available data. Decision makers express preferences over actions and data sets. We derive an alpha-max-min representation of preferences, in which beliefs combine objective characteristics of the data (number and frequency of observations) with subjective features of the decision maker (similarity of observations and perceived ambiguity). We identify the subjectively perceived ambiguity and separate it into ambiguity due to a limited number of ...
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作者：Miettinen, Paavo
作者单位：Bank of Finland
摘要：In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction when the bidders are uninformed of their valuations with probability q and can acquire information about their valuation with a positive cost during the auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in the setting where bidders are ex-ante symmetric and have independent private values. We show that when the number of bidders is large the Dutch ...
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作者：Viossat, Yannick; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; University of London
摘要：Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are epsilon-best reply dynamics where a is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
