Banks as coordinators of economic growth and stability: Microfoundation for macroeconomy with externality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ueda, Kenichi
• 署名单位: International Monetary Fund
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.003
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 322-352
• 关键词: Bank competition; Bank control; GROWTH; instability; Discontinuous game

摘要

Competition among banks promotes growth and stability for an economy with production externality. Following Arrow and Debreu (1954) [6], I formulate a standard growth model with externality a two-period version of Romer (1986) [39]-as a game among consumers, firms, and intermediaries. The Walrasian equilibrium, with an auctioneer, does not achieve the social optimum. Without an auctioneer or intermediaries, I show that no Nash equilibrium exists. With several banks strategically intermediating capital, a Nash equilibrium emerges with a realistic institution, i.e., an interbank market with a negotiation process in the loan market. The equilibrium outcome is uniquely determined and socially optimal. (C) 2012 International Monetary Fund. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.