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作者：Schwerter, Frederik; Zimmermann, Florian
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：Social interactions pervade daily life and thereby create an abundance of social experiences. Such personal experiences likely shape what we believe and who we are. In this paper, we ask if and how personal experiences from social interactions determine individuals' inclination to trust others? In a laboratory experiment, we manipulate social experiences prior to measuring participants' willingness to trust others. We contrast this situation with a non-social control condition where we keep al...
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作者：Amador, Manuel; Bagwell, Kyle
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Stanford University
摘要：This paper uses a Lagrangian approach to provide sufficient conditions under which money burning expenditures are used in an optimal delegation contract. For comparison, we also establish simple sufficient conditions for the optimality of a cap allocation under a restricted set of preferences for a benchmark setting in which money burning is not allowed. We also apply our findings to a model of cooperation and to a model with quadratic preferences and families of distribution functions. In add...
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作者：Chaturvedi, Rakesh
作者单位：Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi
摘要：A holdout problem arises in a land assembly environment in which one buyer is interested in a large landmass characterized by fragmented ownership among many landowners. A simple holdout-resolving mechanism is obtained that asymptotically (as the number of landowners increase) solves a mechanism design problem with two novel criteria. One, a partial coercion constraint that respects property rights only in an 'aggregate' sense; and two, a fairness constraint that requires the terms of trade (p...
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作者：Kayaba, Yutaka; Matsushima, Hitoshi; Toyama, Tomohisa
作者单位：University of Tokyo; International Christian University
摘要：We experimentally examine repeated prisoner's dilemma with random termination, in which monitoring is imperfect and private. Our estimation indicates that a significant proportion of the subjects follows generous tit-for-tat strategies, which are stochastic extensions of tit-for-tat. However, the observed retaliating policies are inconsistent with the generous tit-for-tat equilibrium behavior. Showing inconsistent behavior, subjects with low accuracy do not tend to retaliate more than those wi...
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作者：Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We establish existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in Bayesian games that have a continuous and concave potential at all states of nature, without assuming absolute continuity of information. As an application, we show that Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in many well-known games that have semi-quadratic payoffs (including Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies with linear demand), for general information structures. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Garcia-Pola, Bernardo; Iriberri, Nagore; Kovarik, Jaromir
作者单位：University of Basque Country; Basque Foundation for Science; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：Centipede games represent a classic example of a strategic situation, where the equilibrium prediction is at odds with human behavior. This study is explicitly designed to discriminate among the proposed explanations for initial responses in centipede games. Using many different centipede games, our approach determines endogenously whether one or more explanations are empirically relevant. We find that non-equilibrium behavior is too heterogeneous to be explained by a single model. However, mo...
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作者：Shafer, Rachel C.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Bowling Green State University
摘要：This paper studies minimax regret traders in a sealed bid double auction. Unlike the expected utility maximizers that populate typical market models, these traders do not determine their actions using a single prior. The analysis proves that, with no restrictions on beliefs about others' types and strategies, minimax regret traders will not converge to price-taking as the size of the market increases, contrary to standard economic intuition. In fact, minimax regret traders' bids and asks are i...
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作者：Wu, Qingyun
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：This note reveals a characteristic of stable matchings in the college admissions problem and provides structural insights and a unified treatment for several results on entering classes in this model, including the famous Rural Hospital Theorem. We also show that the worst student determines the entire entering class. (c) 2020 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo; Newton, Jonathan
作者单位：IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; University of Florence; Kyoto University
摘要：This paper considers the marriage problem under dynamic rematching. It is shown that if players who obtain higher payoffs are less likely to experiment with non-best response behavior, then matchings selected in the long run will belong to the set of Rawlsian stable matchings - the set of stable matchings which maximize the payoff of the worst off player. Conversely, alternative behavioral rules will fail to select Rawlsian stable matchings in some environments. This constitutes an evolutionar...
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作者：Schlegel, Jan Christoph
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London
摘要：We study conditions for the existence of stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students' preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that equivalence, properly defined, to a choice profile under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate demand holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and (group)-strategy-proof mechanism. Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result f...
