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作者：Alaei, Saeed; Hardine, Jason; Niazadeh, Rad; Pountourakis, Emmanouil; Yuan, Yang
作者单位：Cornell University; Northwestern University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Stanford University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) showed that the approximation factor of the second-price auction with an anonymous reserve is between two and four. We consider the more demanding problem of approximating the revenue of the ex ante relaxation of the auction problem by posting an anonymous price and derive a formula for their worst-case ratio, d...
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作者：Kavaler, Itay; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：A policy maker faces a sequence of unknown outcomes. At each stage two (self-proclaimed) experts provide probabilistic forecasts on the outcome in the next stage. A comparison test is a protocol for the policy maker to (eventually) decide which of the two experts is better informed. The protocol takes as input the sequence of pairs of forecasts and actual outcomes and (weakly) ranks the two experts. We focus on anonymous and non-counterfactual comparison tests and propose two natural propertie...
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作者：Adriani, Fabrizio; Sonderegger, Silvia
作者单位：University of Leicester; University of Nottingham; University of Nottingham
摘要：How does the incentive to engage in social signaling depend on the composition of peers? We find that an increase in the mean peer quality may either strengthen signaling incentives (keeping up with the Joneses) or weaken them (small fish in a big pond). Both right and left truncations of the distribution of peer quality reduce signaling incentives, while more dispersed peer distributions strengthen them. Finally, more right skewed peer distributions strengthen signaling incentives when only a...
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作者：Alcalde, Jose; Dahm, Matthias
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; University of Nottingham
摘要：We consider a (standard) reverse auction for dual sourcing and propose to determine both the providers' shares and the reserve price endogenously, depending on the suppliers' bids. Our benchmark considers a two-stage game of complete information. After a first round of bidding, the two most competitive suppliers advance to the second stage and compete again with a refined reserve price, which is based on the lowest price of the excluded providers. We show that at the first stage providers reve...
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作者：Isoni, Andrea; Poulsen, Anders; Sugden, Robert; Tsutsui, Kei
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Cagliari; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; University of Bath
摘要：Schelling proposed that payoff-irrelevant cues can affect the outcome of tacit bargaining games by creating focal points. Tests of this hypothesis have found that conflicts of interest between players inhibit focal-point reasoning. We investigate experimentally whether this effect is reduced if players have imperfect information about each other's payoffs. When players know only their own payoffs, they fail to ignore this information even though it cannot assist coordination; the effects of pa...
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作者：Madden, Paul; Pezzino, Mario
作者单位：University of Manchester
摘要：The Hamilton-Slutsky endogenous timing methodology is applied to differentiated duopolies where, motivated by access pricing literature, one firm owns an essential input, sold wholesale to the rival. Both firms then set retail prices for their differentiated goods. The scenario and results are different from standard endogenous timing duopolies, encompassing three prices (one wholesale, two retail) rather than two, with unique timing game equilibrium which always entails retail price leadershi...
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作者：Peralta, Esteban
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This note studies the class of allocations that are fully Bayesian implementable in the presence of verifiable information. I identify a condition, termed evidence distinguishability, that together with incentive compatibility is both necessary and sufficient for full Bayesian implementation in direct mechanisms that elicit verifiable information. I show, however, that every evidence distinguishable allocation that is incentive compatible when verifiable information is not elicited is Bayesian...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Mohlin, Erik
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Lund University
摘要：We develop a framework in which individuals' preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterised by (i) a level of cognitive sophistication and (ii) a subjective utility function. Increased cognition is costly, but higher-level individuals have the advantage of being able to deceive lower-level opponents about their preferences and intentions in some of the matches. In the remaining matches, the individ...
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作者：Dogan, Battal; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of Bristol; Boston College
摘要：The Chicago Board of Education is implementing a centralized clearinghouse to assign students to schools since 2018-19 admissions. In this clearinghouse, each student can simultaneously be admitted to a selective and a nonselective school. We study this divided enrollment system and show that an alternative unified enrollment system, which elicits the preferences of students over all schools and assigns each student to only one school, is better for students when choice rules of schools are su...
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作者：Cuong Le Van; Navrouzoglou, Paulina; Vailakis, Yiannis
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; IPAG Business School; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Glasgow
摘要：We study a two-period exchange economy with complete financial markets and endogenous borrowing constraints. Contrary to perfect foresight paradigm, we assume that agents are heterogeneous in their ability to forecast future prices. We introduce a new equilibrium concept, called informationally constrained equilibrium, where the formation of price expectations is endogenous and reflects the revelation of information from observing bounds on liabilities designed to ensure solvency at any contin...
