Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chaturvedi, Rakesh
• 署名单位: Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology Delhi
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.011
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 325-335
• 关键词: Land assembly; mechanism design; property rights; Eminent domain

摘要

A holdout problem arises in a land assembly environment in which one buyer is interested in a large landmass characterized by fragmented ownership among many landowners. A simple holdout-resolving mechanism is obtained that asymptotically (as the number of landowners increase) solves a mechanism design problem with two novel criteria. One, a partial coercion constraint that respects property rights only in an 'aggregate' sense; and two, a fairness constraint that requires the terms of trade (per unit area) to be the same for every landowner. The mechanism is budget-balanced, semi-anonymous, weakly strategy-proof and non-coercive for the buyer while also being strategy-proof in the large for landowners. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.