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作者：Wu, Binzhen; Zhong, Xiaohan
作者单位：Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University
摘要：We examine matching inequality in students' matching outcomes for the Boston Mechanism in a large matching system, by measuring the degree of mismatch for each student. We link a student's mismatch with her reporting behavior of the first choice on her preference list to explore the reasons for matching inequality. Using administrative data from college admissions in China, we find significant gender differences, rural-urban gaps, and ethnic gaps in mismatching and first-choice behavior. These...
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作者：Fragiadakis, Daniel E.; Troyan, Peter
作者单位：Villanova University; University of Virginia
摘要：Many institutions use matching algorithms to allocate resources to individuals. Examples include the assignment of doctors, students and military cadets to hospitals, schools and branches, respectively. Oftentimes, agents' ordinal preferences are highly correlated, motivating the use of mechanisms that provide agents with channels through which they can express some cardinal preference information. This paper studies two such mechanisms, one from the field and one we design. In each of the gam...
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作者：Georgiou, Konstantinos; Swamy, Chaitanya
作者单位：University of Waterloo
摘要：We consider the design of strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. We give two simple, but extremely versatile, black-box reductions, that in combination reduce the cost-sharing mechanism-design problem to the algorithmic problem of finding a min-cost solution for a set of players. Our first reduction shows that any truthful, alpha-approximation mechanism for the social-cost minimization (SCM) problem satisfying a technical no-bossiness condition can be morphed into a truthful mechanism that ach...
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作者：Kurschilgen, Michael; Marcin, Isabel
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; Max Planck Society; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：In cheap talk games where senders' accuracy of information depend on their background knowledge, a sender with image concerns may want to signal that she is knowledgeable despite having material incentives to lie. These image benefits may, in turn, depend on the type of knowledge and its perceived social status. Theoretically, we show that when some senders care sufficiently about their image, there is both a non-informative babbling equilibrium, and a separating equilibrium, in which the aver...
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作者：Dughmi, Shaddin
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：We use computational complexity as a lens to study the design of information structures in games of incomplete information. We focus on one of the simplest instantiations of the information structure design problem: Bayesian zero-sum games, and a principal who must design a public signal maximizing the equilibrium payoff of one of the players. In this setting, we show that optimal information structure design is computationally intractable, and in some cases hard to approximate, assuming that ...
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作者：Chang, Daphne; Chen, Roy; Krupka, Erin
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National University of Singapore
摘要：Ample evidence shows that certain words or ways of phrasing things can cause us to change our preferences. We demonstrate one mechanism for why this happens - framing evokes norms which then influence choice. We use a laboratory study to test the impact of describing a series of dictator games with either politically charged tax- or neutrally-framed language. Subjects' political identities interact with these frames, causing changes in both norms and choices. Framing makes Democrats prefer equ...
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作者：Fainmesser, Itay P.
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：In many markets, clients engage repeatedly but infrequently in mutually beneficial, trust-intensive interactions with an agent (e.g., markets with investors and entrepreneurs, borrowers and lenders, experience goods, and short-term apartment rentals). To study the role of intermediaries in such markets, we develop a new model of partially observable trust networks, and characterize networks that are robust to variations in market participants' beliefs with respect to the network structure. We ...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher R.; Healy, Paul J.; Lambert, Nicolas S.
作者单位：Georgetown University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Stanford University
摘要：Proper scoring rules incentivize truthful probability reports from risk-neutral individuals. For individuals with much more general preferences (including risk and ambiguity aversion) we use duality techniques to characterize the optimal report in any proper scoring rule. We apply this characterization to several well-known families of preferences, and provide several applications. In particular, for the case of CARA and CRRA preferences we (1) can back out true beliefs from optimal reports, (...
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作者：Choi, Syngjoo; Guerra, Jose-Alberto; Kim, Jinwoo
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); Universidad de los Andes (Colombia)
摘要：We develop a model of interdependent value auctions in which two types of bidders compete: insiders, who are perfectly informed about their value, and outsiders, who are informed only about the private component of their value. Because the bidding strategy of outsiders cannot efficiently adjust with that of insiders, the second-price auction is inefficient. The English auction has an equilibrium in which the information outsiders infer from the history of drop-out prices enables them to bid to...
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作者：Nielsen, Kirby; Bhattacharya, Puja; Kagel, John H.; Sengupta, Arjun
作者单位：Stanford University; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden-action trust game with pre-play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates, but this does not extend to teams. While teams promise to cooperate at the same rate as individuals, they consistently renege on those promises. Additional treatments begin to explore the basis for team behavior. We rule out explanations hypothesizing that concern for partner's payoff drives team outcom...
