Regime change games with an active defender

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jann, Ole; Schottmueller, Christoph
• 署名单位: Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; University of Cologne; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.008
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 96-113
• 关键词: coordination; global games; Panopticon; Regime change games; TRANSPARENCY

摘要

We analyze a regime change game in which an active defender can invest in costly, unobservable defenses. We show that if there are sufficiently many potential attackers, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which the defender chooses to have almost no defenses and attacks almost never occur. This provides a new perspective on coordination problems and the necessity of refinements in regime change games. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.