Optimal priority pricing by a durable goods monopolist

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Correia-da-Silva, Joao
• 署名单位: Universidade do Porto; Universidade do Porto
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.005
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 310-328
• 关键词: Priority pricing; Coase conjecture; durable goods monopoly

摘要

A durable goods monopolist proposes selling mechanisms in two periods, being unable to commit in the first period on the mechanism to propose in the second. Trade is anonymous and resale is not possible. Although buyers have a continuum of possible valuations, the optimal first-period mechanism is a menu with at most two possibilities: a high price guaranteeing delivery and a low price subject to rationing. This characterization is robust to the arrival of additional buyers in the second period. The optimal mechanism is fully characterized for linear demand, with priority pricing being optimal if agents are sufficiently patient. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.