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作者：Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of British Columbia; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Delay after disagreement in committee decision making may foster information aggregation but is costly ex post. When there is an upper bound on delay that can be credibly imposed, repeated delays can improve the ex ante welfare of committee members. An ex ante optimal dynamic delay mechanism does not impose the maximum credible delay after each disagreement. Instead, it induces in equilibrium start-and-stop cycles where players alternate between making the maximum concession to avoid disagreem...
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作者：Pereira, Ana Elisa
作者单位：Universidad de los Andes - Chile
摘要：This paper studies information disclosure when financial supervisors cannot commit to communicate truthfully. A regulator performs a stress test and chooses whether to disclose bank-specific or aggregate results. Results can be biased at a cost (the higher this cost, the more credible the regulator). Manipulating aggregate information may avoid bank failures, but only if credibility is high enough. Supervisors with little credibility cannot prevent systemic runs by misreporting aggregate infor...
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作者：Cerrone, Claudia; Hermstruewer, Yoan; Robalo, Pedro
作者单位：Middlesex University; Max Planck Society
摘要：This article presents the first experiment exploring the impact of debarments - the exclusion of colluding bidders - on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that debarments reduce collusion and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The deterrent effect of debarments increases in the length of the punishment. However, shorter debarments reduce efficiency and increase the bids of non-debarred bidders. This suggests that debarments that are too lenient may trigger tacit collusion amon...
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作者：Duffy, John; Lafky, Jonathan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; Carleton College
摘要：We propose a model of social norms changing in response to evolving privately held preferences. Our aim is to rationalize the tendency for individuals who hold minority preferences to take actions favored by the majority. We do this using a game involving a tension between a desire to act according to one's underlying preferences and a desire to conform to the majority opinion. We find that even after a majority of the population shares what was previously a minority opinion, members of the ne...
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作者：Andreottola, Giovanni
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II
摘要：This paper presents a model of two-stage (primary and general) elections in which primary election candidates differ in terms of a privately observed quality dimension (valence). I show that primary election candidates have the incentive to signal their valence by means of their policy platform choice. There can be two types of separating equilibria in primary elections, with opposite implications concerning the relationship between valence and policy extremism. In an extremist equilibrium val...
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作者：Embrey, Matthew; Hyndman, Kyle; Riedl, Arno
作者单位：University of Sussex; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：Many negotiations involve risks that are resolved ex-post. Often these risks are not incurred equally by the parties involved. We experimentally investigate bargaining situations where a residual claimant faces ex-post risk, whereas a fixed-payoff player does not. Consistent with a benchmark model, we find that residual claimants extract a risk premium, which increases in risk exposure. This premium can be high enough to make it beneficial to bargain over a risky rather than a risk-less pie. C...
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作者：Gesche, Tobias
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative and, at the same time, also to more biased messages. This benefits rational receivers but exerts a negative externality from them on naive or delegating receivers. Disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of the information ...
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作者：Basteck, Christian; Klaus, Bettina; Kuebler, Dorothea
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：School authorities in the UK and the US advocate the use of lotteries to desegregate schools. We study a school choice mechanism employed in Berlin where a lottery quota is embedded in the immediate acceptance (IA) mechanism, and compare it to the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) with a lottery quota. In both mechanisms, some seats are allocated based on academic achievement (e.g., grades), while seats in the lottery quota are allocated randomly. We find that, in theory, a lottery quota stre...
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作者：Li, Wei; Tan, Xu
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We present a new framework in which agents with limited and heterogeneous cognitive ability-modeled as finite depths of reasoning-learn from their neighbors in social networks. Each agent tracks old information using Bayes-like formulas, and uses a shortcut when reasoning on behalf of multiple neighbors exceeds her cognitive ability. Surprisingly, agents with moderate cognitive ability are capable of partialing out old information and learn correctly in social quilts, a tree-like union of cliq...
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作者：Dietzenbacher, Bas
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which aggregate monotonicity (no player is worse off when the worth of the grand coalition increases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible, which turns out to be the class of games where the procedural egalitarian solution selects from the core. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, these two axioms ...
