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作者：Kassis, Mark; Schmidt, Sascha L.; Schreyer, Dominik; Sutter, Matthias
作者单位：WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management; Max Planck Society; University of Cologne; University of Innsbruck
摘要：In this paper, we show that the right to determine the sequence of moves in a dynamic team tournament improves the chances of winning the contest. Because studying dynamic team tournaments - like R&D races - with interim feedback is difficult with company data, we examine decisions of highly paid professionals in soccer penalty shootouts and show that teams whose captains can decide about the shooting sequence are more likely to win the shootout. So, managerial decisions matter for outcomes of...
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作者：Fu, Qiang; Wang, Xiruo; Wu, Zenan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Beijing Jiaotong University; Peking University
摘要：This paper studies a multi-prize imperfectly discriminatory contest with symmetric risk-averse contestants. Adopting a multi-winner nested Tullock contest model, we first establish the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium under plausible conditions. We then investigate the optimal prize allocation in the contest. Our analysis provides a formal account of the incentive effects triggered by a variation in the prevailing prize structure when contestants are risk avers...
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作者：Castro-Pires, Henrique; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper analyzes the optimal menu of contracts offered by a risk-neutral principal to a risk-averse agent under moral hazard, adverse selection, and limited liability. We show that a limited liability constraint causes pooling of the most efficient agent types. We also find sufficient conditions under which full pooling is optimal, regardless of the agent's risk aversion or type distribution. Our model suggests that offering a single contract is often optimal in environments with moral haza...
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作者：Felgenhauer, Mike
作者单位：Brunel University
摘要：Preregistration requires scientists to describe the planned research activities before their project begins. Preregistration improves transparency in empirical research and is an institutional response to scientific misconduct. This paper studies the impact of a preregistration requirement in a model in which a sender can generate information for a receiver by running private experiments. The sender can also engage in uninformative manipulation. This paper argues that a preregistration require...
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作者：Lu, Jingfeng; Lu, Zongwei; Riis, Christian
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Shandong University; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：We study collusion in a second-price auction with two bidders in a dynamic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent. We show that there always exists a robust equilibrium in which the collusion success probability is one. In the equilibrium, for each type of initiator the expected payoff is generally higher than the counterpart in any robust equilibria of the single-option model (Eso and ...
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作者：Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt; Ibsen-Jensen, Rasmus; Neyman, Abraham
作者单位：Aarhus University; University of Liverpool; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：An absorbing game is a two-person zero-sum repeated game. Some of the entries are absorbing in the sense that, following the play of an absorbing entry, with positive probability all future payoffs are equal to that entry's payoff. The outcome of the game is the long-run average payoff. We prove that a two-person zero-sum absorbing game, with either finite or compact action sets, has, for each epsilon > 0, epsilon-optimal strategies with finite memory. In fact, we show that there is an epsilon...
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作者：Casella, Alessandra; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：Columbia University; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; California Institute of Technology
摘要：Vote trading is ubiquitous in committees and legislatures, and yet we know very little about its properties. We explore this subject with a laboratory experiment. We propose a model of vote trading in which pairs of voters exchange votes whenever doing so is mutually advantageous. The resulting trading dynamics always converge to stable vote allocations-allocations where no further improving trades exist. The data show that stability has predictive power: vote allocations in the lab converge t...
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作者：Heydari, Pedram
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：I propose and axiomatically characterize a multi-attribute stochastic choice model that simultaneously generalizes the standard model of deterministic choice and the Luce rule. Attributes are cardinal, independent measures of desirability that are endogenously inferred from observed choices, and thus subjective. An alternative is chosen with a positive probability from a menu if and only if it is undominated attribute-wise in that menu. The model leads to the context-dependent evaluation of al...
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作者：Gaudeul, Alexia; Keser, Claudia; Muller, Stephan
作者单位：University of Gottingen; University of Gottingen
摘要：We theoretically and experimentally study the evolution of strategies reflecting different moral judgments under indirect reciprocity. We fully characterize the asymptotically stable sets of rest points. In all cooperative rest points multiple strategies coexist. This offers an explanation for the heterogeneity in moral judgments among humans. The behavior prescribed by the predicted strategies can rationalize the design of real-life reputation systems, which are set up to resolve problems of ...
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作者：Bahel, Eric; Sprumont, Yves
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; Deakin University
摘要：We describe the class of strategy-proof mechanisms for choosing sets of objects when preferences are additive and monotonic. Keywords: strategy-proofness; additive preferences; decomposability; participatory budgeting. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
