Epistemological implementation of social choice functions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matsushima, Hitoshi
• 署名单位: University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.10.007
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 389-402
• 关键词: Unique implementation; Weak honesty; Common knowledge on selfishness; Ethical social choice function; Quadratic scoring rule

摘要

We investigate the implementation of social choice functions (SCFs) from an epistemolog-ical perspective. We consider the possibility that in higher-order beliefs there exists an honest agent who is motivated by intrinsic preference for honesty as well as material in-terest. We assume weak honesty, in that, although any honest agent has a cost of lying that is positive but close to zero, she (or he) is mostly motivated by material interests and even tells white lies. This study assumes that all agents are fully informed of the physical state, but all agents are selfish never happens to be common knowledge in epistemol-ogy. We show the following positive results for the implementability: with three or more agents, any SCF is uniquely implementable in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE). An SCF, whether material or nonmaterial (ethical), can be implemented even if all agents are selfish and all agents are selfish is mutual knowledge.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).