Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: Two impossibility results

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ramezanian, Rasoul; Feizi, Mehdi
• 署名单位: Ferdowsi University Mashhad; Ferdowsi University Mashhad
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.010
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 356-367
• 关键词: Random assignment problem; Robust ex -post Pareto efficiency; Equal treatment of equals; Equal division lower bound

摘要

A random assignment is robust ex-post Pareto efficient whenever for any of its lottery decomposition, each deterministic assignment in its support is Pareto efficient. We show that ordinal efficiency implies robust ex-post Pareto efficiency while the reverse does not hold. We know that strategy-proof and ordinal efficient mechanisms satisfy neither equal treatment of equals nor equal division lower bound. We prove that it is not possible to avoid these two impossibilities by weakening ordinal efficiency to robust ex-post Pareto efficiency. (C) 2022 Published by Elsevier Inc.