Public communication with externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lukyanov, Georgy; Shamruk, Konstantin; Su, Tong; Wakrim, Ahmed
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.09.003
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 177-196
• 关键词: public information; Optimal bias; externalities; COMMUNICATION

摘要

This paper develops a model in which a sender strategically communicates with a group of receivers whose payoffs depend on the sender's information. It is shown that aggregate payoff externalities create an endogenous conflict of interests between the sender and the receivers, rendering full information revelation, in general infeasible. We demonstrate that an exogenous bias in the sender's preferences can improve public information provision and raise welfare. Two applications of the setup are discussed.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.