Fair cake-cutting in practice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kyropoulou, Maria; Ortega, Josue; Segal-Halevi, Erel
• 署名单位: University of Essex; Queens University Belfast; Ariel University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.027
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 28-49
• 关键词: Cake-cutting; Selfridge-Conway; Cut-and-choose; envy; fairness; Preference manipulation; Experimentation and learning

摘要

Using two lab experiments, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. Although the observed subjects' strategic behavior eliminates the fairness guarantees of envy-free procedures, we nonetheless find evidence that suggests that envy-free procedures are fairer than their proportional counterparts. Our results support the practical use of the celebrated Selfridge-Conway procedure, and more generally, of envy-free cake-cutting mechanisms. We also find that subjects learn their opponents' preferences after repeated interaction and use this knowledge to improve their allocated share of the cake. Learning increases strategic behavior, but also reduces envy. (c) 2022 Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.