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作者：Cao, Yiyin; Dang, Chuangyin
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Xi'an Jiaotong University
摘要：The linear tracing procedure plays a central role in the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Nevertheless, it fails to always select a perfect equilibrium when there are more than two players. To fill this gap, we develop a variant of the linear tracing procedure by constituting a perturbed game in which each player maximizes her payoff against a linear convex combination between a totally mixed prior belief profile and a given mixed strategy profile of other players. A...
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作者：Bade, Sophie
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Max Planck Society
摘要：Semi-consistent conditional preferences are inconsistent enough for different ambiguity attitudes to manifest themselves in different behavior and consistent enough for information to be generically valuable. To simultaneously achieve these two desiderata I assume exactly one type of dynamic inconsistency: agents do not update their preferences upon learning independent randomization outcomes. (c) 2022 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Jindapon, Paan; Sujarittanonta, Pacharasut; Viriyavipart, Ajalavat
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; Chulalongkorn University; American University of Sharjah
摘要：We introduce a game in which each player can allocate her endowment in a prize-linked savings (PLS) account, which awards a fixed prize only to a randomly chosen winner. Like Tullock's contest, the probability for each player of winning the prize is the ratio of her PLS deposit to the total deposits made by all participating players. We derive a unique equilibrium and further examine the effects of introducing PLS as an alternative savings option to standard savings (SS), which yields a fixed ...
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作者：Aziz, Haris; Brandl, Florian
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We consider probabilistic allocation of objects under ordinal preferences and constraints on allocations. We devise an allocation mechanism, called the vigilant eating rule (VER), that applies to nearly arbitrary constraints. It is constrained ordinally efficient, can be computed efficiently for a large class of constraints, and treats agents equally if they have the same preferences and are subject to the same constraints. When the set of feasible allocations is convex, it is characterized by...
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作者：Daskalakis, Constantinos; Syrgkanis, Vasilis
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Microsoft
摘要：A large line of recent work studies the welfare guarantees of simple and prevalent combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price auctions (SiSPAs). These guarantees hold even when the auctions are repeatedly executed and the players use no-regret learning algorithms. Unfortunately, off-the-shelf no-regret algorithms for these auctions are computationally inefficient. We show that this obstacle is insurmountable: there are no polynomial-time no-regret algo...
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作者：Dutting, Paul; Kesselheim, Thomas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bonn
摘要：In a combinatorial auction with item bidding, agents participate in multiple single-item second-price auctions at once. As some items might be substitutes, agents need to strategize in order to maximize their utilities. A number of results indicate that high social welfare can be achieved this way, giving bounds on the welfare at equilibrium. Recently, however, criticism has been raised that equilibria of this game are hard to compute and therefore unlikely to be attained. In this paper, we ta...
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作者：Campos-Mercade, Pol
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Lund University
摘要：Individuals are less likely to make morally desirable decisions when they are in groups. I study when this phenomenon makes groups less likely to produce a morally desirable outcome than one individual alone. I formulate and test a model in which a moral outcome occurs if at least one individual makes a costly decision. Using a lab experiment and data from field experiments on the bystander effect, I show that if most individuals are moral, the moral outcome is more likely to be produced by on...
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作者：Kleinberg, Jon; Kleinberg, Robert; Oren, Sigal
作者单位：Cornell University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We explore the implications of two central human biases studied in behavioral economics, reference points and loss aversion, in optimal stopping problems. In such problems, people evaluate a sequence of options in one pass, either accepting the option and stopping the search or giving up on the option forever. Here we assume that the best option seen so far sets a reference point that shifts as the search progresses, and a biased decision-maker's utility incurs an additional penalty when they ...
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作者：Safi, Shahir
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada
摘要：I consider environments where communication networks are endogenous, but monitoring rules enforce agents to ask consent from others to form new links or break their existing links. A monitoring rule consists of a number x and a collection of groups O such that each agent requires consent from x number of agents in every group she belongs to. First, I show that efficient networks can have at most one component when externalities are positive, whereas they can have multiple components when exter...
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作者：Feri, Francesco; Gantner, Anita; Moffatt, Peter G.; Erharter, Dominik
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of Innsbruck; University of East Anglia
摘要：We consider data from an experiment on the minimum-effort game, repeated over many periods. In each play of the game, each player's belief about the minimum-effort of other players in the group is elicited, in addition to the player's chosen effort level. We find that many agents choose effort levels systematically exceeding their beliefs of others' effort levels. We explain this in terms of such subjects taking the role of leader in an attempt to pull the group towards more efficient outcomes...
