Evolution and Kantian morality: A correction and addendum

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Joergen
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.04.002
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 585-587
• 关键词: Preference evolution; evolutionary stability; Morality; Homo moralis

摘要

Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2016, Games and Economic Behavior) consists of two statements. The first establishes that Homo moraliswith the right degree of morality is evolutionarily stable. The second statement is a claim about sufficient conditions for other goal functions to be evolutionarily unstable. However, the proof given for that claim presumes that all relevant sets are non-empty, while the hypothesis of the theorem does not guarantee that. We here prove instability under a stronger hypothesis that guarantees existence, and we also establish a new and closely related result. As a by-product, we also obtain an extension of Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2013, Econometrica). (c) 2023 Published by Elsevier Inc.