-
作者：Noda, Shunya
摘要：In many random assignment problems, the central planner pursues their own policy objective, such as matching size and minimum quota fulfillment. Several practically important policy objectives do not align with agents' preferences and are known to be incompatible with strategy-proofness. This paper demonstrates that such policy objectives can be attained using mechanisms that satisfy Bayesian incentive compatibility within a restricted domain of von Neumann Morgenstern utilities. We establish ...
-
作者：Dasgupta, Dyotona; Mookherjee, Dilip
作者单位：O.P. Jindal Global University; Boston University
摘要：We characterize Pareto efficient long term 'relational' lending contracts with one-sided lender commitment in a context where the borrower can accumulate wealth, has intertemporal consumption smoothing preferences, and the lender has some sanctioning power following default. We show the negative results of Bulow and Rogoff (1989) do not apply irrespective of the extent of sanctions, the borrower's preferences for smoothing, initial wealth or relative welfare weight. Borrowing, investment and w...
-
作者：He, Simin; Zhu, Xun
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Fudan University
摘要：We investigate a novel continuous-time mechanism in a public-goods game. In this game, a clock ensures that the contributions regularly increase within a fixed period for each player. The players can choose when to stop their contributions from increasing while others observe their actions in real time. We demonstrate, theoretically and experimentally, that such a mechanism effectively improves contributions. Three critical factors could cause improvement: announcements, incremental commitment...
-
作者：Hajikhameneh, Aidin; Iannaccone, Laurence R.
作者单位：California State University System; San Jose State University; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：This paper uses a novel lab experiment to test claims about the origins and functions of religion. We modify the standard public goods game, adding a computer-based agent that adjusts earnings in ways that might depend on players' contributions. Our treatments employ three different descriptions of the adjustment process that loosely correspond to monotheistic, atheistic, and agnostic interpretations of the computer's role. The adjustments neither mask players' contributions nor magnify their ...
-
作者：Min, Daehong
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：I study a problem in which the principal is a decision maker and the agent is an experimenter. Neither the agent nor the principal observes the true state, but the agent can conduct an experiment that reveals information about the true state. The agent has private information about which experiments are feasible, his type. Before the agent conducts an experiment, the principal commits to a decision rule which is contingent on the experiments and their results. When the first-best outcome is un...
-
作者：Unveren, Burak; Donduran, Murat; Barokas, Guy
作者单位：Yildiz Technical University; Ruppin Academic Center
摘要：This study analyzes the space of all continuous and discrete games to see whether self-and other-regarding cooperation are similar or inherently different. The solution concept for self-regarding cooperation is the Kantian equilibrium while other-regarding (i.e., altruistic) cooperation corresponds to the Berge equilibrium. We find that any Pareto-efficient Berge is generically a Kantian equilibrium in all symmetric games (e.g., prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, etc.), whether they are continuous...
-
作者：Papadimitriou, Christos; Peng, Binghui
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Public goods games in undirected networks are generally known to have pure Nash equilibria, which are easy to find. In contrast, we prove that, in directed networks, a broad range of public goods games have intractable equilibrium problems: The existence of pure Nash equilibria is NP-hard to decide, and mixed Nash equilibria are PPAD-hard to find. We define general utility public goods games, and prove a complexity dichotomy result for finding pure equilibria, and a PPAD-completeness proof for...
-
作者：Kor, Ryan; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Tsinghua University
摘要：Using a general network model with multiple activities, we analyse a planner's welfare maximising interventions taking into account within-activity network spillovers and cross -activity interdependence. We show that the direction of the optimal intervention, under sufficiently large budgets, critically depends on the spectral properties of two matrices: the first matrix depicts the social connections among agents, while the second one quantifies the strategic interdependence among different a...
-
作者：Li, Xiangliang
作者单位：Nankai University
摘要：We propose two solutions to Nash (1950)'s bargaining problem: the Consensus and Compromise solutions. They gradually diverge from the Nash solution. Regarding axioms, we decompose the Nash solution's Axiom IIA (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) into distinct parts. The controversial ones are identified and successively replaced, leading to the Consensus and Compromise solutions. The two replacement parts are: 1). If the additional room for cooperation, resulting from deteriorating non-c...
-
作者：Bloch, Francis; Shabayek, Shaden
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper studies optimal targeting when the planner knows the architecture of the network but not the identities of agents occupying different positions in the network. We show that the planner's ability to discriminate among agents depends on the balance between in-and out-neighborhoods in the social network. When influence is reciprocal, the knowledge of the network architecture is sufficient for the planner to implement the first-best actions. When in-and out-neighborhoods are imbalanced,...
