Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Song, Yangwei
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.012
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 56-87
• 关键词: Approximate local incentive compatibility; ambiguity aversion; EFFICIENCY; Informational size; Modified VCG mechanism

摘要

This paper provides a micro-foundation for approximate incentive compatibility using ambiguity aversion. In particular, we propose a novel notion of approximate interim incentive compatibility, approximate local incentive compatibility, and establish an equivalence between approximate local incentive compatibility in a Bayesian environment and exact interim incentive compatibility in the presence of a small degree of ambiguity. We then apply our result to the implementation of efficient allocations. In particular, we identify two economic settings-including ones in which approximately efficient allocations are implementable and ones in which agents are informationally small-in which efficient allocations are approximately locally implementable when agents are Bayesian. Applying our result to those settings, we conclude that efficient allocations are exactly implementable when agents perceive a small degree of ambiguity.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.