Coordinated democracy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.018
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 33-45
• 关键词: Elections; COORDINATION; experiment; social welfare

摘要

Divided majorities can effectively harmonize their votes by the means of algorithmic co-ordinators: mechanisms that aggregate reported preferences and issue voting recommen-dations. We focus on incentive-compatible coordinators, and study their effect on social welfare. While some of them are highly efficient, contrary to common wisdom, some others are welfare reducing, even compared to when no coordinator exists. We conduct a laboratory investigation that provides strong support for these theoretical predictions: when bad coor-dinators are available, subjects are trapped in following their advice, and inferior outcomes prevail. These findings qualify the appeal of centralized coordination and issue caveats re-garding its use. & COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.