Constrained contests with a continuum of battles

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hwang, Sung-Ha; Koh, Youngwoo; Lu, Jingfeng
• 署名单位: Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); Korea University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.011
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 992-1011
• 关键词: Contest; resource allocation; constraints; Continuum of battles; Constraint-adjusted payoffs

摘要

We study a contest problem in which two players compete on a continuum of battlefields by spending resources subject to some constraints on their strategies. Following Myerson (1993), we assume that each player's resource allocation on each battlefield is an independent random draw from the same distribution. Within each battlefield, the player who allocates a higher level of resources wins, but both players incur costs for resource allocation. To analyze this problem, we introduce a systematic way to identify equilibrium allocation strategies and show that any equilibrium strategy of a player renders the rival indifferent in terms of the constraint-adjusted payoff. Using this, we provide a complete characterization of equilibrium allocation strategies. We also show that whereas a symmetric budget constraint may induce players to spend more resources than in the case with no constraint, asymmetric budgets that are proportional to players' values of winning would eliminate this possibility.