A note on one-shot public mediated talk

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Di Tillio, A
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00117-9
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 425-433
• 关键词: communication; mediated talk; correlated equilibrium; communication equilibrium

摘要

Lehrer and Sorin (1997, Games Econ. Behav. 20, 131-148) use a one-shot public mediated talk model to show that, given any probability distribution on the outcomes of a finite normal-form game, there exists a public mediated talk mechanism that simulates that distribution, provided the probabilities on outcomes are rational numbers. It is shown here that a minor amendment of the very same model allows a much stronger conclusion: any distribution on the outcomes, whether the probabilities are rational numbers or not, can be obtained as the outcome of a one-shot public mediated talk mechanism. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.