Program equilibrium
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Tennenholtz, M
署名单位：
Technion Israel Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2004.02.002
发表日期：
2004
页码：
363-373
关键词：
摘要：
In a computerized setting, players' strategies can be implemented by computer programs, to be executed on a shared computational devise. This situation becomes typical to new Internet economies, where agent technologies play a major role. This allows the definition of a program equilibrium. Following the fundamental ideas introduced by von Neumann in the 1940s (in parallel to his seminal contribution to game theory), a computer program can be used both as a set of instructions, as well as a file that can be read and compared with other files. We show that this idea implies that in a program equilibrium of the one-shot prisoners dilemma mutual cooperation is obtained. More generally, we show that the set of program equilibrium payoffs of a game coincides with the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs of it. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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