Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Amorós, P
• 署名单位: Universidad de Malaga
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.03.001
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 424-434
• 关键词: Implementation theory; Nash equilibrium; renegotiation function

摘要

We study Nash implementation when the outcomes of the mechanism can be renegotiated among the agents but the planner does not know the renegotiation function that they will use. We characterize the social objectives that can be implemented in Nash equilibrium when the same mechanism must work for every admissible renegotiation function, and show the importance of allowing the planner to sometimes take away resources from the agents. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.