Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, F
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00122-2
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 348-364
• 关键词: strategic complementarities; supermodular games; subgame-perfect equilibrium; dynamic games; Tarski's fixed point theorem

摘要

I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice-in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out-surprisingly-to be a very restrictive class of games. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.