The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in Internet auctions

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Yokoo, M; Sakurai, Y; Matsubara, S
• 署名单位: NTT, Inc
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00045-9
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 174-188
• 关键词: auction; strategy-proof; mechanism design

摘要

We examine the effect of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. False-name bids are bids submitted by a single bidder using multiple identifiers such as multiple e-mail addresses. The obtained results are summarized as follows: (1) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient when there exists no false-name bid, is not false-name-proof; (2) there exists no false-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency; (3) one sufficient condition where the VCG mechanism is false-name-proof is identified, i.e., the concavity of a surplus function over bidders. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.