Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blume, A; Arnold, T
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University Hohenheim
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00120-9
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 240-259
• 关键词: Game theory; language; learning; COMMUNICATION; information transmission; cheap talk; EVOLUTION; Meaning; incentive alignment

摘要

We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive alignment. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.