Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yi, KO
• 署名单位: Sogang University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00051-4
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 324-348
• 关键词: Quantal response equilibrium; ultimatum bargaining game; backward induction

摘要

This paper investigates the implications of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models [McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, Games Econ. Behav. 10, 6-38; 1998, Exper. Econ. 1, 9-41] in the ultimatum bargaining game. It is shown that, in a normal-form QRE (NQRE), each bargainer's decision depends critically on the anticipated behavior of the other, and there is a NQRE in which the proposer makes any offer between zero and equal split as a strict best response. The application of NQRE to the experimental data [Slonim and Roth, 1998, Econometrica 66, 569-596] suggests that the history dependence observed in the experiment is a result of the strategic interactions between bargainers. (c) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.