The evolutionary role of toughness in bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heifetz, A; Segev, E
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.001
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 117-134
• 关键词: Bargaining; asymmetric information; endowment effect; Self-serving bias; toughness; Evolution of preferences; payoff-monotonic dynamics

摘要

The experimental evidence on the endowment effect [Kahneman et al., J. Polit. Economy 98 (1990) 1325-1348] and the self serving bias in negotiations [Babcok and Loewenstein, J. Econ. Perspect. 11 (1997) 1337-1343] suggests that individuals enter a tough state of mind when they have to make a stand vis-a-vis somebody else. In this work we show how a toughness bias in bargaining may indeed be evolutionary viable. When the inherent toughness of the bargainer is observed by the opponent, this opponent will adjust his behavior accordingly, in a way which may enhance the actual payoff of the biased bargainer. Suppose, then, that a population consists initially of individuals with different inherent degrees of toughness or softness. They are often matched at random to bargain, and biases which are objectively more successful tend to appear more frequently in the society. We characterize a salient class of bargaining mechanisms under which the population will consist, asymptotically, of individuals with some moderate degree of toughness. (C) 2004 Published by Elsevier Inc.