Bargaining with an agenda

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: O'Neill, B; Samet, D; Wiener, Z; Winter, E
• 署名单位: Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Tel Aviv University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.07.002
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 139-153
• 关键词: Nash bargaining solution; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; Ordinal solution; gradual bargaining

摘要

Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: a family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others and still yield the ordinal solution in the limit. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.