Approval voting with endogenous candidates

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dellis, A; Oak, MP
• 署名单位: Williams College; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.010
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 47-76
• 关键词: Approval voting; Citizen-candidate model; comparison of electoral systems

摘要

We present a formal model of political competition under approval voting which allows for endogenous candidate entry. Our analysis yields a number of novel insights. First, we develop a notion of sincere voting behavior under approval voting, called relative sincerity. We then show that the relatively sincere voting behavior is consistent with the strategic calculus of voting. Second, we show that in a one-dimensional model with distance preferences, equilibria in relatively sincere strategies and without spoiler candidates always generate outcomes close to the median voter. Moreover, approval voting satisfies Duverger's Law in the sense that there are at most two winning positions! Finally, we extend our analysis to arbitrary policy spaces. In the general setting, approval voting is shown to be susceptible to the same kinds of problems as the plurality rule, such as the possibility of non-majoritarian outcomes, failure to elect the Condorcet winner and existence of spoiler candidates. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.