A contract-based model for directed network formation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johari, Ramesh; Mannor, Shie; Tsitsiklis, John N.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; McGill University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.010
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 201-224
• 关键词: Network formation games; traffic routing

摘要

We consider a network game where the nodes of the network wish to form a graph to route traffic between themselves. We present a model where costs are incurred for routing traffic, as well as for a lack of network connectivity. We focus on directed links and the link stability equilibrium concept, and characterize connected link stable equilibria. The structure of connected link stable networks is analyzed for several special cases. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.