Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dubey, P; Haimanko, O; Zapechelnyuk, A
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.007
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 77-94
• 关键词: strategic complements and substitutes; pseudo-potential games; Nash equilibrium; Cournot oligopoly

摘要

We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are pseudopotential games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to NE. In particular, NE exist in Cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production. Our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.