Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lenzo, Justin; Sarver, Todd
• 署名单位: Boston University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.012
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 271-284
• 关键词: Correlated equilibrium; evolutionary game theory; Replicator dynamics; subpopulations

摘要

We study a version of the multipopulation replicator dynamics, where each population is comprised of multiple subpopulations. We establish that correlated equilibrium is a natural solution concept in this setting. Specifically, we show that every correlated equilibrium is equivalent to a stationary state in the replicator dynamics of some subpopulation model. We also show that every interior stationary state, Lyapunov stable state, or limit of an interior solution is equivalent to a correlated equilibrium. We provide an example with a Lyapunov stable limit state whose equivalent correlated equilibrium lies outside the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria. Finally, we prove that if the matching distribution is a product measure, a state satisfying any of the three conditions listed above is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.