Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kugler, Tamar; Neeman, Zvika; Vulkan, Nir
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; Boston University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 121-134
• 关键词: centralized markets; decentralized markets; Decentralized bargaining; market design; market formation

摘要

We consider the consequences of competition between two types of experimental exchange mechanisms. a decentralized bargaining market, and a centralized market. It is shown that decentralized bargaining is subject to a process of unraveling in which relatively high value traders (buyers with a high willingness to pay and sellers with low costs) continuously find trading in the centralized markets more attractive until few opportunities for mutually beneficial trade remain outside the centralized marketplace. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.