The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Llerena, F; Rafels, C
• 署名单位: University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.011
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 373-379
• 关键词: Cooperative games; Convex games; almost positive games; modular games; zero-monotonic games; lattice

摘要

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of a specific class of the convex games: the almost positive games. These games have non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above result we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.