Ascending price Vickrey auctions

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Bikhchandani, Sushil; Ostroy, Joseph M.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00141-6
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 215-241
• 关键词: Multi-object auctions; assignment model; Walrasian equilibrium; linear programming; primal-dual algorithm; buyers are substitutes

摘要

We show that an ascending price auction for multiple units of a homogeneous object proposed by Ausubel (i) raises prices for packages until they reach those nonlinear and non-anonymous market clearing prices at which bidders get their marginal products and (ii) the auction is a primal-dual algorithm applied to an appropriate linear programming formulation in which the dual solution yields those same market clearing prices. We emphasize the similarities with efficient incentive compatible ascending price auctions to implement Vickrey payments when there is a single object or when objects are heterogeneous but each buyer does not desire more than one unit. A potential benefit of these common threads is that it helps to establish the principles upon which Vickrey payments may be implemented through decentralized, incentive compatible procedures. (c) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.