The positive foundation of the common prior assumption
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Heifetz, Aviad
署名单位：
Open University Israel
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.002
发表日期：
2006
页码：
105-120
关键词：
摘要：
The existence of a common prior is a property of the state space used to model the players' incomplete information. We show that this property is not just a technical artifact of the model, but that it is immanent to the players' beliefs. To this end, we devise a condition, phrased solely in terms of the players' mutual beliefs about the basic, objective issues of possible uncertainty, which is equivalent to the existence of a common prior. This condition specifies a countable sequence of questions addressed to the players, which detects when there is no common prior among them. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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