A global game with strategic substitutes and complements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karp, Larry; Lee, In Ho; Mason, Robin
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Seoul National University (SNU); University of Southampton
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 155-175
• 关键词: Global games; congestion; COORDINATION

摘要

We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent's payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents' strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action, because of the risk of overcrowding. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.