Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K.; Takahashi, Satoru
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 27-49
• 关键词: Repeated games; Perfect public equilibrium; folk theorem

摘要

We provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring as the discount factor goes to one. Our result covers general stage games including those that fail a full-dimensionality condition that had been imposed in past work. It also provides a characterization of the limit set when the strategies are restricted in a way that endogenously makes the full-dimensionality condition fail, as in the strongly symmetric equilibrium studied by Abreu [Abreu, D., 1986. Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames. J. Econ. Theory 39, 191-228] and Abreu et a]. [Abreu, D., Pearce, D., Stacchetti, E., 1986. Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring. J. Econ. Theory 39, 251-269]. Finally, we use our characterization to give a sufficient condition for the exact achievability of first-best outcomes. Equilibria of this type, for which all continuation payoffs lie on the Pareto frontier, have a strong renegotiation-proofness property: regardless of the history, players can never unanimously prefer another equilibrium. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.