Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sun, Yeneng; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.11.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 131-155
• 关键词: Asymmetric information; core; Pareto efficiency; Walrasian allocation; incentive compatibility; negligible private information

摘要

We consider a perfectly competitive ex ante economy with a continuum of agents and negligible asymmetric information. For such an economy we recast the basic classical results on the existence of Walrasian equilibrium, core equivalence, and the blocking size of coalitions. Moreover, we examine the incentive compatibility of the ex ante Pareto, core and Walrasian allocations. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.