Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kirchkamp, Oliver; Nagel, Rosemarie
• 署名单位: University of St Andrews; Pompeu Fabra University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 269-292
• 关键词: imitation; learning; Local interaction; heterogeneity of environment; experiments; prisoners' dilemma

摘要

In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different size and structure, we observe choices under different information conditions, and we estimate parameters of a learning model. We find that naive imitation, although a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, may be negligible in the experiment. Naive imitation predicts more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless ones-regardless whether interaction neighbourhoods have the same or different sizes in both structures. We find that with some interaction neighbourhoods even the opposite may hold. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.