An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sanchez-Pages, Santiago; Vorsatz, Marc
• 署名单位: University of Edinburgh; Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.014
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 86-112
• 关键词: morally consistent behavior; procedural justice; strategic information transmission; Truth-telling

摘要

A recent experimental study of Cai and Wang [Cai, H., Wang, J., 2006. Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games. Games Econ. Behav. 95, 384-394] on strategic information transmission reveals that subjects tend to transmit more information than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis. To evidence that this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in terms of a tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying, we show in a simple sender-receiver game that subjects incur-ring in costs to punish liars tell the truth more often than predicted by the logit agent quanta] response equilibria whereas subjects that do not punish liars after receiving a deceptive message play, on the aggregate, equilibrium strategies. Thus, we can partition the subject pool into two groups, one group of subjects with preferences for truth-telling and one taking into account only material incentives. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.