Large newsvendor games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Montrucchio, Luigi; Scarsini, Marco
• 署名单位: University of Turin; University of Turin
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 316-337
• 关键词: newsvendor games; nonatomic games; core; balanced games

摘要

We consider a game, called newsvendor game, where several retailers, who face a random demand, can pool their resources and build a centralized inventory that stocks a single item on their behalf. Profits have to be allocated in a way that is advantageous to all the retailers. A game in characteristic form is obtained by assigning to each coalition its optimal expected profit. We consider newsvendor games with possibly an infinite number of newsvendors. We prove in great generality results about balancedness of the game, and we show that in a game with a continuum of players, under a nonatomic condition on the demand, the core is a singleton. For a particular class of demands we show how the core shrinks to a singleton when the number of players increases. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.