Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma
• 署名单位: University of Toyama; Tokyo Metropolitan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.011
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 307-325
• 关键词: augmented revelation mechanism; strategy-proofness; balancedness; quasi-strong-non-bossiness; the revelation principle

摘要

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. We first show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelation mechanism. We next prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strategy implementation, by using an augmented revelation mechanism similar to the one devised by Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava [Jackson, M.O., Palfrey, T.R., Srivastava, S., 1994. Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms. Games Econ. Behav. 6.474-501]. Moreover, we focus on pure exchange economies without free disposal, and try to construct another augmented revelation mechanism that satisfies balancedness in and out of equilibrium, and which implements all strategy-proof social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.