Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cassar, Alessandra
• 署名单位: University of San Francisco
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.008
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 209-230
• 关键词: local network; Random network; small-world network; COORDINATION; COOPERATION; experiment; prisoner's dilemma; graph theory

摘要

A laboratory experiment has been designed to study coordination and cooperation in games played on local, random and small-world networks. For the coordination game, the results revealed a tendency for coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in all three networks, but the frequency of payoff-dominant choices was significantly higher in small-world networks than in local and random networks. For the prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation was hard to reach on all three networks, with average cooperation lower in small-world networks than in random and local networks. Two graph-theoretic characteristics-clustering coefficient and characteristic path length-exhibited a significant effect on individual behavior, possibly explaining why the small-world network, with its high clustering coefficient and short path length, is the architecture of relations that drive a system towards equilibrium at the quickest pace. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.