The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Lahkar, Ratul; Sandholm, William H.
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.002
发表日期：
2008
页码：
565-590
关键词：
摘要：
The projection dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic for population games. It is derived from a model of individual choice in which agents abandon their current strategies at rates inversely proportional to the strategies' current levels of use. The dynamic admits a simple geometric definition, its rest points coincide with the Nash equilibria of the underlying game. and it converges globally to Nash equilibrium in potential games and in stable games. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.