Consistent representative democracy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chambers, Christopher P.
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.003
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 348-363
• 关键词: Social choice; Representative systems; Majority rule; gerrymandering

摘要

We study axioms which define representative democracy in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules partial priority rules. A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can veto certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.