Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jehiel, Philippe; Koessler, Frederic
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.006
• 发表日期: 2008
• 页码: 533-557
• 关键词: analogy expectation; Bayesian games; bounded rationality; COORDINATION; incomplete information; Betting; strategic information transmission

摘要

This paper studies the effects of analogy-based expectations in static two-player games of incomplete information. Players are assumed to be boundedly rational in the way they forecast their opponent's state-contingent strategy: they bundle states into analogy classes and play best-responses to their opponent's average strategy in those analogy classes. We provide general properties of analogy-based expectation equilibria and apply the model to a variety of well known games. We characterize conditions on the analogy partitions for successful coordination in coordination games under incomplete information [Rubinstein, A., 1989. The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under 'almost common knowledge'. Amer. Econ. Rev. 79, 385-391], we show how analogy grouping of the receiver may facilitate information transmission in Crawford and Sobel's cheap talk games [Crawford, V.P., Sobel, J., 1982. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica 50, 1431-1451], and we show how analogy grouping may give rise to betting in zero-sum betting games such as those studied to illustrate the no trade theorem. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.